Thursday, June 22, 2017

In the Fight: What U.S. Army Mental Health Tells Us about Goal Conflict

Goal conflict is a necessary and central part of how organizations work. This is true even if we ignore personal goals that may differ from the organization’s and focus only on the goals that all have to meet, at the same time, for the organization to function well. Cars are made in production lines that require quality, speed, and low cost. Airlines require safety, service, and low cost. Health care requires personal attention, standardized procedures, treatment of all possible conditions, and again low cost. And finally, important for this blog, an army requires its soldiers to inflict injury on others, risk or experience injury themselves, and maintain mental health good enough to go out and do it all over again.

A paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Julia DiBenigno looked at the goal conflict between the U.S. Army’s commitments to providing mental health care and keeping its force mission-ready, and her findings are important for any organization. She addressed a fundamental problem of goals that are in conflict: usually each goal is assigned to specialists with expertise in that specific goal, so resolution does not happen inside someone’s head but rather as an interaction between the people in charge of each specific goal. Usually that is done by prioritizing one goal and assigning the other goal to a service-providing or supervisory function in the organization.

The U.S. Army exists for fighting, and naturally commanders are in charge. But mental health care is also a high-priority goal because the recent wars have put a heavy load on each soldier, and post-traumatic stress disorder and affiliated conditions take highly trained soldiers out of action. Many even commit suicide, spreading the pain more broadly to also affect families of military personnel. This is recognized as a key problem by everyone involved, but solving it involves negotiation between specialists. This leads to push-and-pull with two frequent results: the health care provider is coopted by the commander and serves the commander’s purpose, or the health care provider stays anchored in the care identity and interferes with the commander’s purpose. As a result, most conflicts are poorly solved: analysis found that 5 percent ended with a good mutual solution, in 85 percent either the commander or the health care provider won the battle, and in 10 percent both lost out.

But here is the key message of the article. The statistics I cited were for only two of the four brigades DiBenigno studied. In the other two, 89 percent of conflicts led to a good mutual solution, in 7 percent one party won but not the other, and in 4 percent both lost. This is a really large difference, and the reason for it boiled down to one minor change in organizational structure with major consequences for the process. In the successful brigades, each health care provider was embedded in the clinic but also assigned as a point of contact with specific commanders, which led to longer and more personal interactions than in the other two brigades. The result was an anchored personalization: the provider was anchored in a group of other mental health professionals who shared knowledge and norms, and the provider had a personal network of commanders that allowed learning each commander’s needs and earning trust as well.

The personal interaction proved to be central to understanding each other’s thinking and finding adaptive actions in each situation. It had a massive effect on the ability to find good solutions, especially because the goal conflict was unique in each case. Mental health issues are complex, but so are the needs of military units and their commanders. Perhaps most remarkable is the origin of the difference in problem-solving capacity: just a simple change in organizational structure that regulated which care providers interacted with which commanders created a total change in how these interactions were done. It’s an important lesson for organizational design – how it is done determines what happens later.

DiBenigno, Julia. 2017. "Anchored Personalization in Managing Goal Conflict between Professional Groups: The Case of U.S. Army Mental Health Care." Administrative Science Quarterly, forthcoming: 0001839217714024.

Friday, June 16, 2017

Protest Outside, Protest Inside: How Social Movements Create Labor Unions

Occupy Wall Street protest with union members
Executives of large firms have been known to worry about social movement activity of three kinds. There are movements that encourage various kinds of costly state actions, such as cleaning up pollution or reducing carbon emission, which at some level will lead to taxation to cover the cost. There are movements that engage in boycotts and other actions to discourage firms from various cost-saving misbehaviors such as farming out production to nations with very loose labor and environmental protections. And inside the firm, labor movement advocates take action through established unions or through trying to form new unions where none yet exist. Responding to all this activity can exhaust executives, and they might not like to hear that these movements are related to each other.

How they are related is the topic of an article in Administrative Science Quarterly by John-Paul Ferguson, Thomas Dudley, and Sarah SouleThey look at how social movements outside the firm but in the same city influence unionization drives inside the firm. This is interesting because social movements and unions operate very differently, with unions under much stricter rules and restrictions, so the influence is not a result of workers learning anything useful about unions by taking part in social movements. In fact, it is not even clear that they do take part in social movements, because the mechanism behind this effect requires only that workers can see social movements, not that they participate.

Unions are built on procedures and ideas, with workers’ rights and equal opportunity among the most important ideas. It would make sense that the presence of similar progressive ideas in social movements in the same community could inspire union activity in firms, whereas social movements with more conservative ideology might have less effect on unionization because they have much less overlap with the ideology driving unionization.

This is exactly what the authors found to be true in U.S. cities. Protests in a city led to unionization drives in the same city, and this effect was stronger when the protests were related to progressive causes, including civil rights and gender equality. So protests outside a firm filter into unionization inside, specifically when the outside protests concern issues that workers inside also care about.  But there are additional details that make things even more interesting. Unions are not the only way for workers to solve problems. The Civil Rights movement and the women’s movement also had successes with changing the law, which meant that workers could contest gender or racial discrimination through the legal system rather than through unionizing. As a result, these movements’ effects on unionization were significantly reduced after the legal changes. So ideology matters, but competition from the law does as well.

Protests outside create unions inside, except when there are laws outside that make unions less necessary. What does that mean for our situation now? The laws outside are being weakened, and protests are getting stronger. Could it be a time for more unions?

Friday, June 9, 2017

Action, Embodiment, and Mission: How Leaders Can Make Work Meaningful

Here is a story that may or may not be true: John F. Kennedy met a custodian mopping floors in the NASA headquarters after normal work hours and asked, ‘‘Why are you working so late?’’ The custodian responded, ‘‘Because I’m not mopping the floors, I’m putting a man on the moon.’’ The story is almost too perfect to be true, but it is a close match to historical events that show how the U.S. space program gained its remarkable success, and it offers important lessons in leadership.

In a new article in Administrative Science Quarterly, Andrew Carton reports on Kennedy’s leadership of NASA in the 1960s, which culminated with the moon landing, and key lessons it offers to leaders today. At the center is the knowledge that when people find meaning in their work, everyone benefits: the organization benefits because its employees work harder and smarter, and they benefit because work is a big part of life and success and meaning at work increase well-being. So what’s the dilemma? Usually meaning is best gained from a great goal, but such goals are often abstract and distant from any one task at work. Linking lofty goals to concrete actions is difficult to begin with, but it gets harder as the goal gets loftier. So meaningful work is wonderful, but it’s hard to create.

Here are two examples. First, Amazon seeks to give meaning through its goal of being the earth’s most customer-centric company.  How easy is it for this mission to give meaning to one of its distribution center workers, who could be pulling products from shelves or overseeing a robot pulling products from shelves?  Second, it is part of INSEAD’s mission to reduce poverty in the world, because economic growth is the cure for poverty, and improved management helps economic growth. But the daily work of INSEAD professors and staff is still education.

Kennedy found a way to direct NASA that provided a simple, powerful, and very general way to address this dilemma. First, he distilled NASA’s mission to one of advancing science. But advancing science is not the daily work of a custodian, or even of an expert in electronics who is designing control circuits, so the gap between the lofty goal and concrete actions remained. So in between he placed the concrete objective of a manned mission to the moon before 1970. That concrete objective was not the same as advancing science, but it was an embodiment of the advancing science mission that staff members could more easily relate to. From that embodied objective more concrete plans and projects could be rolled out, and anyone working for NASA – even outside NASA – could gain meaning through connecting to them.

There are other important leadership lessons in the article, but the idea of finding a way to embody an overall mission in a more concrete objective is the most important one. It is also related to an essential insight in management. Much management practice centers on fluffy performances such as missions, speeches, goal statements, and quick tours and interactions. None of this helps if it is disconnected from the activities and meaning of organizational members.  All of it contributes to success if it is oriented toward the embodiment of concrete activities that people can use to choose actions and construct meaning. 

Thursday, June 1, 2017

Trailblazers or Tokens? Women in Top Management and Boards

A famous career effect on women is the glass ceiling – at some point in the career, women find that it is hard to get promoted, harder than it is than for comparable men. Because this has been known for a while and is known to be an unfair and poor use of human capital, there is increasing pressure from institutional investors for firms to promote women’s advancement. This has created a paradox where many, but not all, firms are still set in their usual ways of treating men and women differently, but their owners are seeking change. What are the effects?

A new paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Eunmi Mun and Jiwook Jun has now discovered what happens as a result of these pressures for fairness. It turns out that they come from two places. One is institutional investors, who are concerned with fairness and best use of human capital. The other is corporate social responsibility (CSR) associations and employees, who see fair treatment of employees as an important corporate responsibility.  Both of these help women gain higher-level positions in firms that they would otherwise not have received. But there is a catch, or more accurately, two catches.

The first catch is that at least now, the benefit of having institutional investors and CSR representation in a firm mainly leads to a few women entering the very top positions. So, it can give a board membership that otherwise would not be possible, or top executive level position which would be difficult otherwise, but at any lower level they simply don’t have any effect. That’s why women in the top levels could be tokens to show outsiders that the firm is fair, but without really changing the inside of the firm.

The second catch is that the emphasis on breaking the glass ceiling is not an international trend. Much of it is driven by Europe and North America, and has effects worldwide because so much of the world’s capital, and hence institutional investors, comes from these nations. In fact, I did not mention that this research is on Japanese firms, and the effect of institutional investors is from foreign institutional investors, not domestic ones. The domestic ones don’t help women’s careers. That does not mean that the token effect is only outside Europe and North America – this research is pioneering in showing that it exists precisely because Japanese firms are more open about their internal hiring at lower levels than firms in most other nations are.

So where does that leave women’s careers? A few token hires do not really break the glass ceiling, they just hide it. In many of these boards, one out of 12 members was a woman. But the research suggests that they could be trailblazers too. Another finding in the paper is that women in the board also helped women in non-managerial positions, so maybe they are the start of more equal careers. Although we should be careful about drawing too optimistic conclusions – women in the board had no effect on women in managerial positions. We need to wait and see before we know how this unfolds.

Thursday, May 25, 2017

The Reaper is Sociable: Leadership of Extravert CEOs

There are two important trends in the world of business today.  The first is that traditional large corporations are gradually becoming less important, as new technologies, improved markets, and better financing allow smaller firms to be founded and operate more easily. My predecessor as editor of the journal Administrative Science Quarterly, Jerry Davis, has written a book on that. There is also another trend that seems to indicate that the opposite is happening. There is a small set of extremely large corporations in services, industry, and finance that are amassing exceptional power. Added up, these trends mean that the number of somewhat-large, but not the largest, corporations is declining.

One result of these trends is that researchers are now looking more closely at CEO personality, because in both the smallest and the largest firms any departure from rational decision making is very consequential. It can destroy a small firm, and it can wreak havoc on the world around a large firm.  A paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Malhotra, Reus, Zhu, and Roelofsen has now examined the extraversion of CEOs and how that influences mergers and acquisitions done by their firms. Extraversion is a personality trait and is one that we understand well and like a lot, at least at parties. Extraverts liven up the world around them because they are sociable, active, and very likable. This is a good thing, but also something that is hard to connect to management.

The connection lies in the less well known side of that personality trait. Extraverts are also agentic – it is very important for them to take care of their own interest and to get ahead of others. Sociability and likability are parts of that trait, because extraversion means that they get to dominate their surroundings.  And outside of parties, the same agentic traits can be reflected in them having clear goals to benefit themselves as much as possible, possibly at the expense of others, and of being skilled at persuading others that their initiatives are good. Does the extravert sound less appealing now, but also more consequential as a manager?

Acquisitions are a great way to test the consequences of extraversion because they eliminate the acquired firm and usually harm the acquiring firm, because on average, acquiring firms lose money by over-paying for the acquisition. As a result, a CEO with the firm’s best interest at heart will be very selective about when to acquire another firm and will typically focus on smaller acquisitions that help the firm acquire important technology, market access, and other missing pieces, while being relatively inexpensive because small firms are often overlooked, or even not listed in the stock market. But small firms are also boring, and not something an extravert wants to acquire in order to grow the firm fast and look good doing it.

So what did the authors find? Indeed extravert CEOs acquire more often, and they acquire larger targets. They are especially likely to do so when they have freer hands, such as when they are in less competitive industries or when they are powerful relative to the board of directors. Turn extravert CEOs loose, and you will see firms around them get eaten up. Of course, all of this would be OK if the acquisitions turned out to be a good thing. Do we know if they did? Well, extraverts got a more positive immediate reaction from the stock market than others, but let’s not believe that this means a lot. First, keep in mind that investors are just another set of people to impress, and extravert CEOs are good at that. Second, better reaction to one acquisition than others does not say much because most acquisitions are not welcome. Third, immediate reaction is very different from the long-term benefit of an acquisition.

So we know that extravert CEOs benefit themselves by getting attention from acquisitions, and by growing the firm so that they in turn can get paid more – a larger firm means better pay. We don’t know whether that helps the firm. And somehow, I can’t help but wonder whether our not knowing is something that the extravert CEO likes a lot.

Friday, May 19, 2017

Excellence in Research and Food: What we have learnt from Cattle Ranching

Administrative Science Quarterly is a research journal that for the last few years has published roughly 20 articles per year, which is slightly more than what some other journals will publish in 1.5 months. ASQ is very selective, yet we have found a way to be even more selective by also recognizing excellence in the articles we publish. Every year an award is given to one article for its scholarly contribution over the previous 5 years. These articles are available here, and I will give one example in this blog. It is about grass-fed beef.

Those who are into gourmet or health food dining will recognize grass-fed beef as specially produced to the cleanest, most environmental, and most original standards, and as being a premium product that can be obtained in the best restaurants and stores. They are unlikely to know that grass-fed beef used to be sold at a discount because it lacked the fat marbling and tenderness of beef from cattle produced the standard way, with a finishing period where the cattle were eating corn and grain in feedlots. How did the discounted product of the past become today’s premium product?

The answer is given in an ASQ article by Klaus Weber, Kathryn Heinze, and Michaela DeSouzey. It involves a social movement that helped drive forward activists and entrepreneurs who coalesced around the ideas of authenticity in farming, sustainable nature management, and using only natural materials and processes. All of these principles were in opposition to normal farming methods, which the activists saw as industrial, non-sustainable, and relying on artificial materials and approaches. These activists were a social movement, but they did not have a company, a set of customers, a way to market what was special about grass-fed beef, or even a clear way to earn a living. Instead, they produced a language, a social grouping, and a belief system that a set of entrepreneurs could organize around.

The next steps were creation of the new market for the now-premium product of grass-fed beef. Farms switched to grass-fed methods, often helped by other farms or by publications devoted to these methods. The entrepreneurs and other parts of the industry, including the social movement, created informal standards for how to conduct grass-fed farming. They sought out customers for the growing set of producers and volume of (now-premium) beef. Throughout this process, a social movement organized around ideas of protecting nature, preventing cruelty to animals, and promoting human health rallied resources in ways that created a new niche of an industry, and an opportunity for entrepreneurs.

The key insight from this research is the sequence of events: entrepreneurs with new ideas and products can in principle build markets through individual efforts, but it is difficult to accomplish. Once a social movement has made a cultural foundation, entrepreneurial effort is much easier, so it is accelerated and more likely to succeed. The sequence leading to the grass-fed beef you may be eating soon started with an idea and a language to use in making it a reality.

Thursday, May 11, 2017

Is Women’s Liberation for Men Only?

I understand that the title of this blog post is confusing and borderline annoying, so I will come straight to the point: There is new research evidence that women’s career opportunities can be made more equal to men’s if their male bosses think they should be. Not if their female bosses do. I think this is surprising and worrying enough that I should explain what is going on.

This concern is based on research evidence from a paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Seth Carnahan and Brad Greenwood, and it is based on law firm careers. You might think that lawyers have specialized careers, and you would be right. They are specialized in ways that are useful for testing the theory, however, because the top-class law firms in the sample recruit very similar people, so there is little of the variation among employees that could be used to explain any differences between men and women. Also, heavy-handed discrimination is not possible here because lawyers know how to, you know, file lawsuits. As you can imagine, finding any discrimination at all between men and women in this context would be surprising and interesting. It gets especially interesting because we can use politics to find out what managers want, assuming that liberal lawyers have liberal views including gender equality and that conservative lawyers don’t. Donations to the Democratic and Republican parties are good measures of ideology.

So we know whether the managers (partners) are liberal or conservative, and we know the gender of the employees (associates), and that’s all we need. Carnahan and Greenwood went ahead and analyzed the data, finding that conservative offices hired fewer female associates. Liberals practiced equality in hiring, and the difference reached levels that can be measured even for these elite lawyers. Same story for assignments to task forces and for promotions: women are better off working for liberals.

But then the surprise comes: distinguishing between male and female managers, they found that the helping of women could be shown for only liberal male partners, not liberal female partners. So women’s equality in law firms seems to be for men only to decide. How is that possible? It seems unlikely that women partners care less, especially if they are also liberal. But how much change people make depends on how much they try and how much power they have. That’s where the men have the edge. There are more of them and they are in more senior positions, so ultimately what counts is how men view women’s careers.

Earlier I wrote one blog post on the book Lean In criticizing its depiction of women’s career opportunities and another blog post on research correcting this depiction. Lean In is too optimistic about women’s opportunities to make changes for themselves. This research presents one more problem for the Lean In idea because it suggests that what women think of themselves or of other women is less consequential because they have less power. Real-life careers are not about leaning in, but pulling up.

Friday, May 5, 2017

That Super Networking Coworker Really Is a Nuisance: Hurting (or Helping) Productivity

So let us start with a person we all know from work – the networking one, who not only knows all the coworkers who are natural to know, but also knows people far away in the organization. We often refer to people like that as brokers, because their position means that they can deliver useful information for work across the organization, in addition to gossip, of course. There are at least a few of them in any given workplace, and they can be a nuisance because of the suspicion that the networking they do helps them just as much as their work does – that they get ahead by talking, not working. Of course that suspicion is correct; researchers have known it for decades.

But there is more to the story, and there is new evidence from a paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Julien Clement, Andrew Shipilov, and Charles Galunic. They looked at how the brokers who connect to and also work in different communities affect the productivity of other workers in creative organizations – specifically, TV game show production. Now, creativity is one activity we know benefits from access to information elsewhere and from being a broker – again something we learned a decade ago, but only that the broker benefited, not whether the coworkers did. A study like this could show that the broker may seem like a nuisance but actually is a help because of the information brought in from afar.

That is almost true, but not quite. It turns out that brokers who also have commitments in the communities to which they connect help their nearby coworkers who are involved in creative tasks but not their other coworkers who need their contribution to production tasks. Most workers in any given organization are not creative workers; they do work that helps the operations of the organization. They make goods and services happen. Brokers are unlikely to be helpful for them, because they already know what they need to know, and the broker going around asking questions and sharing gossip is really not useful in any way. But maybe the broker is doing no harm, so their productivity is the same whether or not they have a broker nearby? Sorry, no such luck. It turns out the broker actually hurts the productivity of coworkers doing non-creative tasks.

Brokerage is an organizational task that helps the person doing it, helps creative people who are in touch with that person, and hurts the rest. The broker not only seems like a nuisance but is one too. This is a dilemma, of course, because organizations need ideas and action. Ultimately it is a familiar dilemma in all things organization: anything we can do to help one set of activities is likely to hurt different activities. Sounds like organizations need managers.

Friday, April 28, 2017

Putting It Together: How Organizations Handle Conflicting Goals

Airlines want to be safe, friendly, and profitable. Maybe not in that order, but all three are important.  Luxury brands in cars, clothes, bags, and watches all want to be exclusive and high-selling. Both at once, of course. These combinations involve conflict among different goals, which means that at some level there has to be a compromise. Saying that compromise is needed is not enough to understand it. How and when will United Airlines make a compromise between friendly and profitable without, for example, compromising the friendly part? And how does Rolex make a compromise between exclusivity and high sales?

The answers to these questions involve both a final outcome and a process of reaching a compromise. Now we know more about the process, thanks to a paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Carlo Salvato and Claus Rerup. They look at product development in Alessi, the Italian company making all those household items that either you or someone you know has purchased. They make products with great designs that are inexpensive relative to the price of many comparable products, and at least in principle it is pretty easy for other makers to produce legal (or illegal) variations of them.

How does Alessi combine the goals of artistic design and effective manufacturing? We can see the results – egg holders, for example, that are wonderfully playful and well designed but obviously inexpensively produced. The process is harder to see, and that is exactly why some firms like Alessi can put these goals (and products) together very well, but most competitors cannot. The process involves three steps, which function to blend goals and routines in a way that creates a balance between them. First, splicing means connecting routines associated with different goals – like bringing a visionary designer in contact with how things are made. Second, activating means using routines that make people take each goal into account and consider how they can be balanced. Third, repressing means using routines that simplify tasks that benefit some goals while drawing people away from other goals.

Splicing, activating, and repressing are actions that can be taken any time, one by one or in combination. That is not the way to create consistency in how an organization puts things together, however, because if they are done through improvisation the results will differ every time. That is exactly why routines are involved in splicing, activating, and repressing, because routines mean that the same or similar results can be expected every time. Managers can help design and redesign the routines so that employees handle goal conflicts well. 

The results are easy to appreciate. Alessi is consistent in how they do things, which means that every new product is an artistic surprise, but we know it will be economically made too. United Airlines is inconsistent, so flights don’t always avoid dragging passengers off, nor do they always involve passenger dragging (fortunately). We all understand that conflicting goals involve compromises.  As long as the compromises are consistent, we know what we are getting and can make informed choices. In the long run, the consistency is more important than the goal resolution itself.

Thursday, April 20, 2017

Fair Play and Racial Bias in the NBA

In most National Basketball Association (NBA) games, we see a white coach on the sidelines and mostly black players on the court. We also see players being benched and put back in depending on how well they play, their foul trouble, and the matchup with the other team. Except for the oddity of having a league of mostly black players produce mostly white coaches, the NBA looks like it is ruled by performance only, because winning is so important and performance is so easy to assess. But it is ruled by more than performance. White coaches use white players more than they should, and black coaches use black players more than they should, compared with others who perform equally well.

This is not a special feature of the NBA. Favoring workers of the same race is well known and happens everywhere, for three different reasons. We now know more about it because a paper by Letian Zhang in Administrative Science Quarterly has looked at this unfair treatment and explored it in detail never before seen. The findings are important for any kind of business because they show the origin of same-race favoritism, how it can be reduced, and why there are limits to reducing it.

First consider the origins of this favoritism. Many people think that preferential treatment occurs because employers judge each person as being as good as the average person with similar characteristics. This explanation is often used for why women are treated less well (supposedly they are less stable employees than men) and can also account for racial preferences. But in this case, this explanation falls flat because black basketball players are on average better than white. A variation is that employers look at each person as being as good as they think the average is for someone with those characteristics, but they are wrong about the average. For example, managers may think that women are less stable, but their estimate is off because men, who (granted) get pregnant less often, quit more often than women. Both of these reasons for favoritism should adjust quickly once a manager gets to know an individual’s performance, which happens very fast in the NBA because of the excellent statistics on player performance.

But there is another reason for favoritism that is more insidious: racial preference. Simply put, people prefer to interact with others of the same race. Looking closely at the data, Zhang found that in NBA playoff games and close games, race no longer influenced someone’s playing time; only performance did. That’s exactly what we would expect from racial preference, because it is easier to treat workers unfairly when the stakes are low.

So how can this effect be reduced? Well, time reduces unfair treatment. In the NBA, the unfair playing time is reduced the longer a coach works with the same player, but it takes more than two years for a player to be treated almost fairly by a coach of another race. This length of time doesn’t match up with performance knowledge, but it matches something else: managers have a harder time treating someone unfairly when they get to know that person well enough to see him or her as an individual, not as a racial stereotype. This is the “good black player” effect in the NBA.

But if managers can start treating someone of another race fairly after a period of time, will they then start seeing others of another race as individuals, too, and treat them fairly sooner? The answer is no, at least in the NBA. Getting to know someone of a different race as an individual does not mean that fair treatment is extended to others; they still have to prove themselves one by one. And that should give pause to all organizations, because it says that even the NBA, with its highly integrated teams and its careful and timely objective performance measures (not to mention the high stakes), has a remaining racial component in the treatment of workers.

The conclusion is clear, and different from what many organizations do. Fair treatment is so hard that it is not possible to rely only on the immediate supervisor; there also have to be formal processes in place to make sure it happens.

Thursday, April 13, 2017

Think about Thinking: How Management Models Stay Relevant

Have you ever thought of how easy things are for physics researchers? The laws of physics have stayed pretty much the same through the entire history of the discipline of physics. The only significant change is that researchers have gained better theory for understanding them and better tools for testing the theory. Lucky them.

In contrast, management scholars face constant change in the world of organizations, because what goes into organizations changes – technology, people, and laws – and what organizations try to influence in their environment changes as well – especially markets, but also technology, people, laws, and so on. As a result of all these inside and outside changes, organizations change, and the laws of organization (yes, they exist) change over time, too. We have known this for a while but have not known how. A new paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Zlatko Bodrožić and Paul Adler looks at how they change.

They focus on technological revolutions, which may be the most decisive influence because other factors (like people and laws) often follow. Just compare the work of coal miners (whom the president sees as important for the future of the U.S.) with computer programmers (the present and future of India). Coal miners work in rigid hierarchies with clearly defined processes because of the safety concerns and communication difficulties they face, and they also face highly mechanized work that requires them mainly to serve their tools. They are an extreme case of the factory, which has its own set of theories that solved many problems 100 years ago but are now barely taught, though their insights survive in mines and factories. Computer programmers are organized in groups with clearly defined tasks but full freedom to design the solution and the process for arriving at the solution, and they face a knowledge-based, communication-heavy workplace in which people create and use intergroup networks to assemble and use knowledge. They work in network organizations, which have their own set of theories that are slightly more recent than the explosive growth of such workplaces.

Every time a technological revolution happens, existing theories begin to fail because they address the wrong kind of organization. The failures are recognized by scholars, who then start building new theories for the new reality. Often spurred by visible problems in organizations, they recognize that the new problems are different. They try to find theoretical solutions to these problems and test them, finding that many are wrong but some are right. As the research accumulates, science proceeds as usual and the best models are agreed on. Then these models are spread, first within the community of scholars and then to the practice of management. Because it takes a while to go through these steps, the period after any technological revolution is one in which few people know enough, though many – both scientists and managers – think they know a lot. The laws of organization have changed, and we need to find the new ones.

So, physics scholars really do have an easier job than management scholars. That’s pretty obvious. What is less obvious is that when we hear some entrepreneurs leading major web-based businesses complain about the uselessness of business schools, they are half right and half wrong. The right part is that researchers are catching up, so the schools clearly know less about their business than about coal mines, or even software outsourcing firms. The half wrong part is that they don’t know, either – it is possible to be right about a decision without knowing why – and scholars will soon catch up and know this technology and its organizations well.

Friday, April 7, 2017

Gourmet Food Truck Strategy: How Strategic Groups Compete

Let’s start with a fact known by some fortunate people, but far from everyone.  There are gourmet food trucks that serve food of a quality found in good restaurants, but on four wheels and in either fixed or varying locations. Nice, right? In the world of strategy, gourmet food trucks would be a strategic group, distinct from other kinds of food services (such as regular food trucks, fast food retail, or brick-and-mortar gourmet restaurants). The way we normally teach strategy, firms in a strategic group compete little with firms outside and a lot with firms within.

Many things we teach are not quite true because they come from early research. For strategic groups, a paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Scott Sonenshein, KristenNault, and Otilia Obodaru offers some very interesting new insights. Let’s start with competition.  Gourmet food truck operators lend each other supplies, help each other make repairs, volunteer to work for each other, share locations, promote each other, and make a wide range of helpful suggestions to each other.  Oh wait, that was the list of cooperative behaviors. What they do to compete is... practically nothing. They aim for excellence in the product, but also for uniqueness. For gourmet chefs, excellence is not competition, it is their calling in life. Aiming for uniqueness and promoting it is not competition, it is avoidance of competition.

In fact, they do more to maintain the integrity of the strategic group than to compete with each other. Breaking municipal rules, copying from other chefs, and intruding on parking spots are all actions that weaken the community of gourmet food trucks by exposing them to authorities or creating internal conflict. And now I used the word that they often use: community. The strategic group of gourmet food trucks is held together by a shared identity and feeling of community, and the actions of each come from them wanting to build the community and belong to it. They literally build the community through actions that make it easier for others to join – another no-no in strategy, where you are supposed to stay as isolated as possible in order to maintain pricing power.

So are the gourmet food trucks unusual, or is there something wrong about strategic groups theory? Probably both. The unusual part of gourmet food trucks is that they are a high-end product, and uniqueness is such a strong part of the sales pitch – and identity – that ordinary competitive moves are slow to materialize. The incorrect part of strategic groups theory is overlooking how individual firm owners think about their work in ways that are shaped by other members. This shaping of their thinking takes place through creation of an idea of what a proper firm looks like, and it is easily maintained through community-building actions. Although some of the helping seems excessive and possibly costly for the helping firm, it is actually not easy to tell whether that is true or not. Especially for a young strategic group, building a community also establishes the group as a well-defined entity in the minds of customers, regulators, and suppliers. Less competition, more cooperation – possibly giving a stronger position overall, at the cost of less individual jockeying for a better position.

Interesting insights about strategy from a strategic group that we would all like to have nearby.

Sunday, April 2, 2017

Caught in the Web of Finance? When Network Connections Are Missing

Following the news can give the impression that the world of business, and finance especially, is very well connected internally and to other sources of profits. As of March 16, the still-understaffed Trump administration had hired five people from Goldman Sachs, and coincidentally, Goldman has reported that increased trading has helped its quarterly profits increase more than threefold.  Simultaneously and unrelated to this, billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who now advises the president on deregulation, has seen his shares in his oil refinery increase significantly in value (oil refineries are regulated because of their pollution and climate effects).
So is finance a web that entangles everyone? Not really. Goldman Sachs is special because the bank has and exercises market power, which in turn helps attract network ties. Icahn’s role is, well, a bit more personalized and complicated. In general, though, finance is an industry that competes like any other industry, and network ties among its firms adapt to competitive concerns. This is why a paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Pavel I. Zhelyazkov nicely shows how networks have systematic gaps both in finance and other industries.  

To start, networks connect because introductions and friends-of-friends connections help firms find trustworthy and capable partners when they want to execute complex tasks that are too big for one firm alone. This is the logic driving networks tie formation. The same logic of why ties are formed helps explain why ties do not form, leading to gaps in the network. First, the need for firms to find trustworthy and capable partners means that connections are premised on success – friends recommend their good friends, not the cheats and failures they know. Second, the use of ties to help share tasks means that connections are not made to strong competitors, because they might just take the entire business away. In fact, for close competitors the more capable are the ones that should be avoided the most, because they could take away a big portion of the business.

So does this logic hold? The study looked at venture capitalists seeking investment ties from private equity limited partners, which is an interesting tie because venture capitalists look for promising firms to invest in, and private equity is a big pool of money. They work together, and they work on a complex task of finding good prospects and helping them succeed. Venture capitalists do form networks that interconnect them and private equity partners, as one would expect if venture capitalists who have some past connection also make introductions. But also, as expected, these ties are formed exactly when there is past success and absence of low competition – past failures or current competition create gaps in the network.

So are the venture capitalists the normal kind of network builders, or are investment banks like Goldman Sachs normal? Arguably the venture capitalists are normal, because they deal with uncertainty and competition, which are constants in business. Centers of power, whether economic or political, play by different rules than the rest of the world.

Monday, March 20, 2017

Making Stupid Phones Smarter: Will a New Strategy Be Imitated?

Qualcomm just announced products that will be used to help feature phones take advantage of 4G networks. Let me translate that sentence (for those who need it). A feature phone is what some call a stupid phone – the opposite of a smartphone, because it is missing features such as the ability to install software. The screen is also simpler, and the price is much lower – around $20 in the markets that sell feature phones. 4G networks are made for smartphones, not for feature phones. Qualcomm is aiming for smarter feature phones, which would use 4G networks for higher bandwidth material such as video transmission. The trick is that consumers would like such material and might pay more for phones that provide it, and the telecom carriers would also like consumers to move into 4G so they can start shutting down 2G and 3G networks.

Feature phones that use smartphone (4G) networks is an example of a market position, and a pretty innovative one too. Will it remain Qualcomm’s position alone, or will others follow? Well, Qualcomm’s usual market position is smartphones that use (of course) smartphone networks, and there they have seen rivals such as MediaTek move in. Market positions are not secret, and an easy way to make a strategy is to imitate what others do. In fact, these market strategy moves are a reminder of a paper I published in Administrative Science Quarterly in 1996 on the diffusion of a market position. I found that such strategic moves probably involve a lot of planning inside the firm, but from a researcher’s point of view they just look like copying. Strategic actions are taken after planning and thinking, but plans and thoughts are very much influenced by what the competition is doing. As my son (who studies data mining) might say, strategic planning is a human task that a computer can mimic.

If we think about this particular strategic move, can we use the evidence to predict the next strategic moves? I think so. Innovations like the feature phone using 4G happen for a reason. The reason is that smartphone sales are stalling, and a key reason is that some of the largest phone markets (India and Indonesia) have remained stubbornly dominated by feature phone even though the telecoms are making 4G networks and local and foreign producers are offering smartphones. The advanced market is not doing well, and the in-between market has a gap. I think we will see MediaTek and others moving to imitate this market position.

Let me add a small postscript to this post. Every now and then I look for an old ASQ paper to write about, and this time I decided to go 20 years back. Then I realized that I published my second paper in ASQ 20 years and four months before becoming the ASQ editor. Here it is:

Tuesday, March 14, 2017

La La Land Entrepreneurship: When Does the Specialist Entrepreneur Win?

In La La Land, Sebastian is such a dedicated jazz pianist that he cannot bear playing other kinds of music – and after many trials and travails, he succeeds as an entrepreneur, starting the jazz club of his dreams. A wonderful story of entrepreneurship (the movie had a love story too, I think), but is it realistic? It depends on who you ask.

A recurring theme in entrepreneurship is the trust in generalists – people who can master a wide range of tasks. This trust comes from one big-picture and one small-picture consideration.  The big-picture consideration is that successful entrepreneurship has a component of inspiration gained from combining ideas that others do not see as connected. You may be carrying the descendant of such a combination: the iPhone was put together by a company making compact MP3 players that had just exited an alliance with Motorola to make cellular phones. The small-picture consideration is that smaller entrepreneurs often end up being in charge of everything, first directly, then through having to find and recruit expertise in each function. Generalists are good at this.

But could Sebastian have become a capable founder of a jazz club if his interests and skills were all over the place? The argument against generalists is that they are superficial and don’t know enough about any specific topic to do well. A paper in the Administrative Science Quarterly by Olenka Kacperczyk and Peter Younkin has waded into this argument with important ideas and some evidence. Fittingly, the evidence is on music industry entrepreneurship: artists forming independent record labels.

The key idea emerging from their research is this: pure generalists have no particular advantage in entrepreneurship; what is needed is one area of specialization combined with general knowledge elsewhere. Specifically, specialization in the market pays off when combined with general knowledge on the tasks needed for production. This combination buys both credibility and the understanding of customers, which are more important to specialize in than the mechanics of making a product. The investigation showed big effects of market specialization, and effects that were complementary to functional breadth. Market specialists could double their odds of success by becoming more general in functional knowledge; market generalists had low odds to begin with and did not improve much when gaining more general functional knowledge.

So, Sebastian got lucky. Yes, he had market knowledge, but he knew little about different functions (I am not counting tap dancing as a useful function).  A more typical case would be Justin Timberlake, whose specialization in R&B and popular music was combined with band membership, songwriting, performing as a backup singer, and music production. So, today’s practical advice: if you want to form a music label, follow Justin’s lead.

Kacperczyk, Aleksandra (Olenka) and Younkin, Peter Y. 2017. The Paradox of Breadth: The Tension between Experience and Legitimacy in the Transition to Entrepreneurship. Administrative Science Quarterly, forthcoming.  

Monday, February 27, 2017

Why Double Standards? Investment Advice from Women

Let’s start with two facts that are not very well known. The first is that investment professionals actually share advice sometimes, although it happens in certain closed online platforms.  By investment professionals I mean people who are managing money, such as mutual fund or hedge fund managers. They are different from stock analysts, who are professional advisors, not professional investors. The second, which it bothers me even to need to write, is that some investment professionals are women. Unfortunately, women are a small minority in this field.

So when investors look at advice posted by investment professionals, do they evaluate the advice from men and women equally, or is there a double standard? This is the topic of research in Administrative Science Quarterly by Tristan Botelho and Mabel Abraham, who examined whether and when women’s advice is valued less than men’s advice. Notice how interesting this context is for examining double standards. Everyone is professional. All the advice is on securities, which means that the outcomes can be traced to see whose advice is better. (In case you wonder, there is no difference between men and women.) Oh, and this is all online, so the evaluators are reading text and thinking about the reasoning.

That does not stop double standards from appearing.  Investors could see the names of the people posting recommendations before deciding whether to open them, and they were less likely to open and look at a recommendation written by a woman. Women were about 25 percent more likely to be ignored. Female readers of this post can consider whether that sounds familiar.  Investors were especially likely to ignore female investment professionals when they had a lot of information to sift through.  This evidence matches what we already know, but it is powerful evidence from real professionals making decisions about substantial amounts of money.

Now for something we didn’t know. After seeing the advice, the investors can voluntarily rate its quality and give comments. How large was the double standard in the rating? There wasn’t any. This demonstrates an important difference in how double standards are used. They are a first-cut way of approaching someone’s value and performance, but once individuals have more time to process information and think, double standards decline and may even disappear. Whether they typically disappear in other contexts, we don’t know. Investors need to think very carefully about their decisions and may turn out to be less biased after considering a recommender’s information than people in many other roles are. Possibly they are less biased than others with significant responsibilities, such as politicians.

Monday, February 20, 2017

My Kind of Fraudster: How Social Group Affects Responses to Misconduct

We know that shared identity is a tool used to gain the confidence of people before defrauding them, and we suspect that it works especially well for an identity strengthened by current discrimination or a history of persecution. Bernard Madoff’s exploitation of the Jewish identity to recruit for his Ponzi scheme is a recent example of how this is done, and many more cases exist. An interesting follow-up question has rarely been considered, though: what happens to the identity after the fraud has been discovered?

In a very creative and solid piece of research, ChristopherYenkey explores this issue in AdministrativeScience Quarterly. His case is one of a stock brokerage in Nairobi that defrauded one-quarter of its clients (about 25,000 people). The clients were from many ethnic groups, and the brokerage was clearly identified with one of them. This is a dilemma for members of the defrauding (and also defrauded) ethnic group: who should they trust, and how much? For those not part of the defrauding group, the choice is easier: after the fraud, they trusted the group affiliated with the brokerage less, and trusted the institution of stock brokerages less, so they invested less than they had previously.  This effect was strongest for ethnic groups that were rivals of the ethnic group connected with the fraud, as opposed to neutral ethnic groups.

But what about members of the ethnic group associated with the fraudulent brokerage who had been personally defrauded? They made interesting choices. Like everyone else, they invested less following the fraud—but still more than neutrals, and definitely more than rivals. Shared ethnicity cushioned the blow of the fraud. In a very promising investment opportunity that happened soon after the fraud, those with shared ethnicity who had been defrauded invested more than the others, suggesting that they may have been most confident about trying to recover their lost money through investments.

The investors of different ethnicities also showed other reactions to the fraud, such as starting to doubt brokerages and placing more investments through banks, which could also act as stock market intermediaries. Naturally the choice between organizational forms is not as personal as the choice of ethnicity to transact with, so the movement away from brokerages was seen for all ethnic groups. Still, it was again the rival ethnic groups that moved the most, suggesting that the experience of being defrauded had the biggest impact on their future actions.

Trust is personal, which is why social groups can make it easier. Fraud is also a very personal experience, and affront, and reactions to it show very clearly how boundaries in our society affect people’s responses to each other and to organizations.

PS: I chose not to mention the name of the ethnic group controlling the fraudulent brokerage in this post. Kenya is a place where ethnic relations are sensitive because of power differences and a history that involves violent events as well as periods of peace.

Tuesday, February 14, 2017

Our Secret Environmentalism: We Don’t Say We Are Sustainable

Firms are under continued pressure to certify themselves as virtuous, good, effective, high quality, and any number of other positive things. Often they display the certification prominently. For example, if you type “General Motors ISO” or “General Electric ISO” into Google, it will fill in “9001,” because both companies display prominently on the web that they are ISO 9001 certified.

There is an interesting exception to this. Many firms are certified as environmentally responsible through the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, but four out of ten DJSI firms do not display this certification. Why would a firm with such a positive achievement not promote it? Chad Carlos and Ben Lewis have a new article in Administrative Science Quarterly that looks at the reasons for this silence, and they find that it is a strategic silence. They are silent because it is a way of avoiding attention, and attention to sustainability could be risky for the firm.

Firms don’t announce why they stay silent about an environmental certification, of course, but we can see how they behave. Carlos and Lewis found that they are more likely to invoke strategic silence if they run the risk of looking like hypocrites. The main problem for firms is to lose their reputation through being called out as less sustainable than they claim to be or should be. So, we should expect firms that have good environmental reputations to be more concerned about looking bad if their commitment to the environment is called into question. That is exactly what Carlos and Lewis found.

Shareholders can file resolutions against firm actions that go against sustainability. If they do, and if the firm has a good environmental reputation to begin with, the firm is especially likely to be strategically silent about the DJSI certification. Other stakeholders can target the firms through boycotts, demonstrations, and other protest actions. If they do, and if the firm has a good environmental reputation to begin with, the firm is likely to be strategically silent about the certification. It’s clear that those firms already seen as good on environmental issues are very careful not to have this reputation damaged by any charges of being hypocritical. That means sometimes keeping the sustainability certification out of sight, to avoid attracting attention.

The evidence is interesting because certification is usually an initiative to do three things: make firms follow a standard, make firms influence others to follow the standard, and make firms compete to beat the standard. The firms that were secret environmentalists broke this chain by only doing the first of these three steps. Through their strategic silence they did not influence other firms, and they did not compete to be the most environmental either. Many try to influence firms, for many purposes, but it is important to keep in mind that firms also want control over what they do, and they have a wide range of actions to escape the control of others.

Monday, February 6, 2017

Since the Roman Empire: Organizations Engage History to Make Changes

How to change an organization? The answer to this question is made surprisingly difficult by all those who think that change is unnecessary, change is risky, and in any case it should be change that favors their favorite option; nothing else will do. Using history to promote a change effort is an old trick that makes a lot of sense, because it is a way of claiming that change is actually a return to a golden age. And history can be edited in many ways, so it is a very flexible trick. Managers use it.

But can it be more than a managerial trick to manipulate the organization? New research by Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz in Administrative Science Quarterly shows how change can be created in a more autonomous fashion by employees reaching back into the organizational history. The research follows two distinct and independent occasions that Carlsberg brewery used its old motto, the latin phrase semper ardens (always burning) to foster change. In each case the users were different and the change was different, but the old and flexible motto proved a way to successfully make changes with less controversy. In one case, a group of master brewers working on their own used it to formulate, gain acceptance for, and launch a craft beer line, in stark contrast to the industrial beer that was the core of Carlsberg. In the other, it was proposed by consultants seeking to create a unifying statement for Carlsberg, which had become large and diverse through recent mergers,and then promoted internally in the organization.

Even though these processes were unrelated, they followed a remarkably similar sequence.  The steps are described in detail in the paper, but here I want to focus on the two final ones: renewing and re-embedding. Renewing is central when history is used to motivate change, because the new activities are never exact equivalents of the historical record. Indeed, the historical record can be unclear or even contradictory, so renewal is needed. Semper ardens was a phrase favored by the second generation Carlsberg owner, but did not have any concrete brewing practices associated with it. But the master brewer team reached back into the brewing recipes from that time period, and combined these with the passion for improvement expressed through the “always burning” meaning to create beers that were distinct in taste and packaging.  

Re-embedding is actions taken to give the referral to history endurance in the organization. This is needed because the change attempts are frequent and often override previous ones, including those backed by history, so without embedding changes may become temporary. The master brewer team were able to embed semper ardens into the organization well enough that it lived on in a new craft brewery project even after the beer using it as a label was discontinued, and as a marker of distinction used when announcing extraordinary team efforts or noteworthy events. Thus the motto lived on in its renewed form of encouraging a passion for improvement at Carlsberg. And passion for improvement is, we might agree, useful both for organizations in general and for beer brewers specifically.

Monday, January 30, 2017

Fertilizing Green Chemistry: How an Occupation Renews Itself

Green chemistry is a set of principles to make chemistry healthier, safer, and more environmental. It has made significant changes in how chemistry is done, and in a way that is very different from how we usually think of reforms in organizations. Usually we think of a powerful outside actor starting reform, like the state, not individuals in an occupation. Usually we think of reforms as a series of prescribed practices, not as principles that each actor translates into practices. With no powerful actor to prescribe and no practice to prescribe, it seems like a puzzle that green chemistry could even become important. How did it happen?

The answer is connected to a set of mechanisms that describe how occupations can change themselves, and is described in a paper by Howard-Grenville, Nelson, Earle, Haack, and Young in Administrative Science Quarterly. The method behind the mechanisms is based on two ideas: change is voluntary, and the people in the occupations are highly diverse. As a result, many people with different views and professional practices need to be persuaded. This is a common problem for social movements that seek to reform occupations from inside, so it is broader than the specific case of green chemistry. And, it is a complicated problem too, as green chemistry showed.

The advocates of green chemistry used three methods: 1) portraying it as normal, 2) explaining how it was morally right, and 3) saying it was a pragmatic approach. Each of these three methods had limited success because they were tailored to specific chemist roles, but in total they were effective because they covered key roles in the occupation. Normal portrayals matched the chemistry professionals as being innovators. Moralizing worked through the teaching role that many of them had. Pragmatic matches their role is industrial problem solvers.  Any chemistry professional might spend some time in each of these roles, and some were heavily dedicated to one of them, making them open to influence through these different methods.

But using three methods has one disadvantage: they are inconsistent, and this is easy to recognize. The inconsistency of the methods also led to inconsistency in the principles – imagine how much stricter the moral approach was – and lack of clarity in how one could do green chemistry. However, the inconsistency was not enough to make green chemistry fail. Because many chemistry professionals accepted these principles, as a result of any of the three methods of persuasion, they instead turned their focus on how to make them consistent – either by finding ways to integrate them, or by finding ways of switching focus depending on circumstances.

This is interesting because it suggests that internal reform does not work the same way as a political movement. Political movements thrive on apparent consistency in messaging and principles, and will typically try to solve (or deny) inconsistency before turning to advocacy. Occupational movements do not need consistent messages, but rather that each individual occupation member is convinced. They will later find ways to solve the inconsistency, because occupational members – unlike political movements – encounter inconsistency in their daily work and are used to finding solutions. Green chemistry has succeeded through a combination of persuasion methods followed by problem solving.

Monday, January 23, 2017

War, Exploration, and Interference: The Rise of Amateur Broadcasters

In daily life we know that professionals rule the roost. Anything remotely important is done by a profession with restricted access to practice and many rules for practitioners -- or it is done illegitimately. Did you undergo medical treatment last time you were ill, or did you see a homeopath? Many activities that seem easier and safer also take on profession-like features. Espresso making is done by a high-pressure machine, but there is still a barista profession with formal training and certification. Researchers also have been interested in professions, especially because their effects range from regulating the safety and quality of important service (again, think doctors) to restricting access to work in a way that looks like a power grab (pick your favorite example).

So is there room for non-professionals to get things done? Gregoire Croidieu and Phillip Kim answer that question in a recent article in Administrative Science Quarterly, looking at the key role of amateurs in the development of radio broadcasting in the US. They show that amateurs can get a significant role if the right conditions are in place, even as professionals, companies, and the state seek to push them to the margins. How? Well, that’s where the war, polar exploration, and interference come in.

Let’s start with interference. Technically that is what happens when radio transmitters are near each other in signal spectrum and physical space, and distort each other’s transmissions. It was a major reason that many sought to limit access to the airwaves of amateurs, especially those building their own transmitters and behaving independently from the profession. Socially the limitation of access was also a form of interference – trying to make it hard to be an amateur. But radio amateurs were enthusiastically building up their lay expertise and using it, legally or not. Except for the WWI years, they could be given access as registered radio operators.

That brings us to the war. WWI was when radio amateurs were blocked from the airwaves, with security given as the reason, but it did not mean that they stopped broadcasting. They signed up for military service instead, and fully half of the military radio operators were originally amateurs. This was when the state recognized the value of the lay experts, and took advantage of their skills. After the war, they were supposed to return to their old status as marginal actors, more than before (rising to 20,000 in 1922), but still regulated and limited. Professional radio operators still campaigned against amateurs, seeing them as having little value.

This is where the polar explorations come into play. The amateurs were many, highly skilled, and willing to experiment, and they soon registered a series of technical accomplishments – including shortwave communications with the North Pole, which had been thought impossible. The amateurs, through their lay expertise, became leaders in radio. This role soon turned into the start of radio as an industry and as lay culture, because the establishment of radio stations for communicating to many – instead of point-to-point – happened in parallel. Radio ownership and interest in radio listening rose also, and the radio broadcasting industry eventually grew to as many radio stations as there were licensed radio operators in 1921.

War, exploration, and interference were three of the elements that brought amateurs to the forefront of radio, against the resistance of professionals, companies, and the state. Clearly it was not an easy process, and it took a lot of interest to gather the necessary momentum. Does this show that amateurs have a clear role in society, or that they can overcome the odds under special circumstances? We clearly need to learn more about this so we can understand when activities become professionalized, and when they are open to amateurs.

Croidieu, G., Kim, P.H. (2017). Labor of Love: Amateurs and Lay-expertise Legitimation in the Early U.S. Radio Field. Administrative Science Quarterly